Deep-learning based classification algorithms have been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks: minor changes to the input of classifiers can dramatically change their outputs, while being imperceptible to humans. In this paper, we present a simple hypothesis about a feature compression property of artificial intelligence (AI) classifiers and present theoretical arguments to show that this hypothesis successfully accounts for the observed fragility of AI classifiers to small adversarial perturbations. Drawing on ideas from information and coding theory, we propose a general class of defenses for detecting classifier errors caused by abnormally small input perturbations. We further show theoretical guarantees for the performance of this detection method. We present experimental results with (a) a voice recognition system, and (b) a digit recognition system using the MNIST database, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense methods. The ideas in this paper are motivated by a simple analogy between AI classifiers and the standard Shannon model of a communication system.
Related Works
Ever since Szegedy et al. pointed out the vulnerability of deep learning models in [48] , the community has witnessed a large volume of works on this topic, from the angle of either attackers or defenders. From the attackers' side, various types of attacking methods have been proposed in different scenarios, ranging from white-box attack where the attackers know everything about the deep learning system such as system structure and weights, hyperparameters and training data [10, 13, 22, 28, 36, 39, 42, 48] to black-box attacks where the attackers know nothing about the system structure or parameters but only access to the queries of the system [6, 13, 16, 23, 35, 38] . Although the existence of adversarial samples was originally pointed out in image classification tasks, the attacking methods for generating adversarial samples have been applied to various applications such as text classification [30] , object detection [52, 58] , speech recognition [11] , and autonomous driving [5] .
From the defenders' side, recently proposed methods for improving the safety of deep learning systems include [2] [3] [4] 9, 12, 18, 19, 21, 26, 27, 31, 32, 34, 37, 40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 53, 56, 57] . Most of these methods fall broadly into the following several classes: (1) adversarial training where the adversarial samples are used for retraining the deep learning systems [3, 22, 45, 48, 50] ; (2) gradient masking where the deep learning system is designed to have an extremely flat loss function landscape with respect to the perturbations in input samples [4, 40] ; (3) feature discretization where we simply discretize the features of samples (both benign samples and adversarial samples) before we feed it to the deep learning systems [37, 57] ; (4) generative model based approach where we find a sample from the distribution of benign samples to approximate an arbitrary given sample, and then use the approximation as input for the deep learning systems [18, 21, 26, 31, 32, 43, 47] .
The vulnerability of deep learning systems and its ubiquitousness raised the security concerns about such systems, and the community has been making attempts to explain the vulnerability phenomena [17, 20, 22, 33, 36, 41, 48, 49, 54] either informally or rigorously. In [48] , Szegedy et al. argued that the adversarial samples are low-probability elements within the whole sample space, and less likely to be sampled to form a training or testing data set when compared with those from training or testing data set. This results in the fact that the deep learning classifiers cannot learn these adversarial samples and can easily make wrong decisions over these samples. Besides, since these low-probability samples are scattered around the training or testing samples, the samples in training or testing data set can be slightly perturbed to get these adversarial samples. In [22] , Goodfellow et al. proposed a linearity argument for explaining the existence of adversarial samples, which motivated them to develop a fast gradient sign method (FGSM) for generating adversarial samples. Later on, some first attempts from the theoretical side are made in [20, 41, 49] . A boundary tilting argument was proposed by Tanay et al. in [49] to explain the fragility of linear classifiers, and they established conditions under which the fragility of classifiers can be avoided. Later on in [20] , Fawzi et al. investigated the adversarial attacking problem by analyzing the curvature properties of the classifiers' decision boundary. The most recent work on explaining the vulnerability of deep learning classifiers was done by Romano et al. in [41] where they assumed a sparse representation model for the input of a deep learning classifier.
In this paper, based on the feature compression properties of deep learning systems, we propose a new rigorous theoretical understanding of the adversarial phenomena. Our explanation is distinct from previous work. Compared with [22, 48] which are empirical, our results are more rigorous. The results in [49] are applicable for linear classifiers, while our explanation holds for both linear and nonlinear classifiers. In [20] , the authors exploited the curvature condition of the decision boundary of the classifiers, while we only utilize the fact that the classifiers will always compress high dimensional inputs to low dimensional latent codes before they make any decisions. Our results are also different from [41] where they required the inputs to satisfy a sparse representation model, while we do not need this assumption. Our theoretical explanation applies to both targeted and untargeted attacks, and is based on an very intuitive and ubiquitous assumption, i.e., feature compression property.
In [21] , the authors used class-dependent image reconstructions based on capsule networks to detect the presence of adversarial attacks. The method in [21] is in spirit similar to our work: both approaches try to "decompress" from classifier output (or from outputs of hidden layers), to reconstruct higher-dimensional signals, in order to detect whether there exists adversarial attacks. Compared with [21] , our trust-but-verify framework is inspired by information and coding theory, and comes with theoretical performance guarantees. After we independently worked on experiments of our trust-but-verify adversarial attack methods for MNIST dataset, we learned of the work [44] which proposed an optimization-based image reconstruction approach via generative models, to perform robust classification for MNIST dataset. The approach in [44] is close to one of our trust-but-verify approaches (see Section 4.2.2) for MNIST dataset. Compared with [44] , this paper has several differences: a) the trust-but-verify approaches were inspired by information and coding theory and comes with corresponding theoretical performance guarantees; b) the trust-but-verify approaches which are based optimizations can be more general, and can be used to reconstruct functions of the higher-dimensional signals, rather than the full signals themselves (please see Section 2.1); c) the trust-but-verify approach is more computationally efficient than the method [44] , without requiring solving an optimization problem for every class (10 optimization problems for MNIST); and d) the trust-but-verify approaches do not have to solve optimization problems to perform signal reconstructions, for example, the pixel regeneration network (Section 4.2.1) for MNIST.
Notations: Within this paper, we denote the set {1, 2, · · · , N } by [N ] , and the cardinality of a set S by |S|. For a vector x ∈ R N , we use x S to refer to the sub-vector of x with entries specified by set S. An AI classifier can be defined as a system that takes a high-dimensional vector as input and maps it to a discrete set of labels. As an example, a voice-recognition AI takes as input a time series containing the samples of an audio signal and outputs a string representing a sentence in English (or other spoken language). More concretely, consider Fig. 2 which explores a simple analogy between an AI classification system and a digital communication system.
Problem Statement
The purpose of the AI system in Fig. 2 is to estimate the state of the world u ∈ U where the set of all possible world states U is assumed to be finite and are enumerated as u 1 , u 2 . . . , u Nu , where N u is the size of U. The input y ∈ R N to the AI classifier is a noisy version of signals x ∈ R N , and x depend on u and on a number of extraneous parameters v ∈ V. Note that the state u i is uniquely determined by its index or "label" i. The output of the AI classifier is a state estimateû ∈ U, or equivalently, its label. The AI classifier in Fig. 2 is clearly analogous to a communication decoder: it looks at a set of noisy observations and attempts to decide which out of a set of possible input signals x was originally "transmitted" over the "channel", which in the AI system models all signal impairments such as distortion, random noise and hostile attackers.
The "Signal Synthesis" block in the AI system maps input features into an observable signal x. In the abstract model of Fig. 2 , the synthesis function f (·) is deterministic with all random effects being absorbed into the "channel" without loss of generality. Note that while the encoder in the communication system is under the control of its designers, the signal synthesis in an AI system is determined by physical laws and is not in our control. However, the most important difference between communication and AI systems is the presence of the nuisance parameters v. For instance, in a voice recognition system, the input features consist of the text being spoken (u) and also a very large number of other characteristics (v) of the speaker's voice such as pitch, accent, dialect, loudness, emotion etc. which together determine the mapping from a text to an audio signal. Thus there are a very large number of different "codewords" v 2 ) , . . . that encode the same label u 1 . Let us define the "codeword set" for label i, i = 1 . . . N u :
We assume that the codeword sets X i satisfy:
for some r 0 > 0, where · represents 2 norm. In other words, all valid codewords corresponding to different labels i = j are separated by at least a distance 2r 0 . In the voice recognition example, under this assumption audio signals corresponding to two different sentences must sound different. This guarantees the existence of the ideal classifier defined as the function q * (y) :
By definition, the ideal classifier maps any valid input signal to the correct label in the absence of noise. Fig. 3 shows an abstract model of a classifier that is constrained to make final classification decisions based on only a compressed version z of y. Specifically, we assume that there exists a compression function h : R N → R M , where M N such that the classifier output q(y) : R N → U can be written as q(y) = g(h(y)), where g : R M → U is a decision function. We define the "compressed codeword sets" as
We will assume that the sets Z i are disjoint so that the compression map h(y) preserves information in y about the label i.
We will show that a classifier constrained to use only h(y) for decoding, even if designed optimally, can retain its robustness to random noises, but is necessarily vulnerable to adversarial attacks that are significantly smaller in magnitude. By contrast, uncompressed classifiers can be robust to both random and worst-case noise. In other words, we show that adversarial fragility can be explained as an artifact of feature compression in decoders. We will detail our analysis in Section 3.
Trust but Verify: an Information Theory Inspired Defense against Adversarial Attacks
We propose a general class of defenses, inspired by methods in information and coding theory, to detect the presence of adversarial attacks. To motivate our proposed defense methods, consider a communication system, where a decoder decodes the received signal y to message label "j". To test the correctness of the decoded label j, the receiver can "decompress" label j by re-encoding it to its corresponding codeword c j , and check whether the pair input x = c j and output y are consistent, under the communication channel model p(y|x). For example, in decoding using typical sequences [14] , the decoder checks whether the codeword c j is jointly typical with the received signal y, namely whether the pair (c j , y) follows the typical statistical behavior of the channel model. Sphere decoding algorithms for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless communications check the statistics of the residual noise (specifically, to check whether the noise vector is bounded within a sphere), to provide the maximum-likelihood certificate property for the decoded result (or the decoded label) [24, 51] .
Similarly for AI classifiers, we propose to check whether the classification result label j is consistent with input signal y, in order to detect adversarial attacks. Generally, we compute a consistency score sc(j, y) between label j and y: the lower the score is, y and label j are more consistent with each other. Specifically, suppose the classifier outputs label j for input signal y. Define c j (y) as:
and define
If we observe that d j (y) = y − c j (y) (namely the score function sc(j, y) ) is abnormally large, this means that the observed signal y is far from any valid codeword f (u j , v) with label j and we conclude that label j is inconsistent with observations y. This, however, requires a feasible method for calculating c j (y) for a label j and signal y. When, for a label j, there is one unique codeword corresponding to j, we can easily evaluate (4) and thus determine whether label j is consistent with input y. However, as noted earlier, in AI classification problems, a label j does not uniquely correspond to a single codeword; instead there is a large codeword set X j associated with each label j corresponding to different values of the nuisance parameters v. In this case, evaluating (4) will need a conditional generative model mapping label j to all the possible corresponding codewords in X i , using which we perform optimization (3) to obtain (4) . Under mild assumptions on the encoding function f (·), we can provide theoretical guarantees on a detector assuming a well-functioning generative model. Solving (3), however, can be computationally expensive since there can be a vast number of codewords corresponding to label j. To resolve the issue of high computational complexity of the former approach, we further propose a more general, and sometimes more computationally efficient, approach for checking the consistency between label j and input signal y. We consider two functions: p(y) : R N → R P and ta(y) : R N → R Q , where P and Q are two positive integers. Our approach checks the consistency between label j, p(y) and ta(y). Here j and p(y) serve as prior information for the codewords, and, conditioning on them, we try to "predict" ta(y).
We compute a consistency score sc(j, p(y), ta(y)) between label j and y: the lower the score is, label j, p(y) and ta(y) are more consistent with each other. One example of such a score is given by the following optimization problem. We define c j (y, p(y), ta(y)) as:
where N (p(y)) means a neighborhood of p(y). We further define
Similarly, if we observe that d j (y, p(y), ta(y)) . = ta(y) − ta(c j (y, p(y), ta(y))) (namely sc(j, p(y), ta(y)) ) is abnormally large, the observed signal y is far from any valid codeword f (u j , v) with label j and we conclude that label j is inconsistent with observations y. Compared with (4), the upshot of this approach is that there can be a unique or a much smaller set of codewords c satisfying p(c) being in the neighborhood of p(y). Namely, assuming label j is correct, there is often a sufficiently accurate prediction of ta(y), based on function p(y). Suppose that the original signal x belongs to label i. Then we would pick functions p(y) and ta(y) such that, for different labels i and j,
where r 1 is a constant. The criterion (7) means that, even though a classier can be fooled into classifying y to label j, a prediction ta(c j ), conditioned on p(c j ) ∈ N (p(y)), will be dramatically different from ta(y), thus leading to the detection of the adversarial attacks.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we perform theoretical analysis of the effects of adversarial attacks and random noises on AI classifiers. We assume that, for a signal y ∈ R N , an ideal classifier will classify y to label i, if there exits a codeword c = f (u i , v i ) ∈ X i for u i and a certain v i , such that y − c ≤ r, where r is a constant.
Without loss of generality, we consider a signal x ∈ R N which an ideal classifier will classify to label 1. We further assume that the closest codeword to x is c 1 = f (u 1 , v 1 ) for u 1 and a certain v 1 . For any i = 1, we also define c i as the codeword with label i that is closest to x:
We define the sets S 1 and S i as the spheres of radius r around c 1 and c i respectively, namely
We assume that x ∈ S 1 . For simplicity of analysis, we assume that, for a vector y ∈ R N , the classifier q(y) outputs label i if and only if h(y) = h(b) for a certain b ∈ S i .
We consider the problem of finding the smallest targeted perturbation w in magnitude which fools the decoder q(x + w) into outputting label i = 1. Formally, for any x ∈ R N , we define the minimum perturbation size d i (x) needed for target label i as:
Let us define a quantity d(x, t), which we term as "effective distance between x and t with respect to function
Then for any vector x ∈ R N , we can use (8) to upper bound the smallest required perturbation size
For an > 0 and l > 0, we say a classifier has ( , l)-robustness at signal x, if
where w ∈ R N is randomly sampled uniformly on a sphere 1 of radius l, and P means probability. In the following, we will show that for a small , compressed classifiers can still have ( , l)-robustness for l d i (x), namely the classifier can tolerate large random perturbations while being vulnerable to much smaller adversarial attacks.
Classifiers with Linear Compression Functions
We first consider the special case where the compression function h(·) is linear, namely h(y) = Ay with A ∈ R M ×N , M N . While this may not be a reasonable model for practical AI systems, analysis of linear compression functions will yield analytical insights that generalize to nonlinear h(·) as we show later. Theorem 1. Let y ∈ R N be the input to a classifier, which makes decisions based on the compression function z = h(y) = Ay, where the elements of A ∈ R M ×N (M N ) are i.i.d. following the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). Let B i = {z : z = Ab, b ∈ S i } be the compressed image of S i . Then the following statements hold for arbitrary > 0, i = 1, and a big enough M . 1) With high probability (over the distribution of A), an attacker can design a targeted adversarial attack w with
such that the classifier is fooled into classifying the signal y = x + w into label i. Moreover, with high probability (over the distribution of A), an attacker can design an (untargeted) adversarial perturbation w with
such that the classifier will not classify y = x + w into label 1.
2) Suppose that w is randomly uniformly sampled from a sphere of radius l in R N . With high probability (over the distribution of A and w), if
, the classifier will not classify y = x + w into label i. Moreover, with high probability (over the distribution of A and w), if
the classifier still classifies the y = x + w into label 1 correctly.
3) Let w represent a successful adversarial perturbation i.e. the classifier outputs target label i = 1 for the input y = x + w. Then as long as
our adversarial detection approach will be able to detect the attack.
Proof. 1) We first look at the targeted attack case. For linear decision statistics
by solving this optimization problem, we know the optimal w is given by w = A † A(t − x), where A † is the MoorePenrose inverse of A. We can see that w is nothing but the projection of (t − x) onto the row space of A. We denote the projection matrix as P = A † A. Then the smallest magnitude of an effective adversarial perturbation is upper bounded by min
For t ∈ S i , we have
One can show that, when S i = {t | t − c i ≤ r}, we can always achieve the equality, namely
Now we evaluate P (c i − x) . Suppose that A's elements are i.i.d., and follow the standard zero-mean Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), then the random projection P is uniformly sampled from the Grassmannian Gr(M, R N ). We can see that the distribution of P (c i − x) is the same as the distribution of the magnitude of the first M elements of (c i − x) o/ o , where o ∈ R N is a vector with its elements being i.i.d. following the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). From the concentration of measure [15] , for any positive < 1,
Then when M is big enough,
with high probability, for arbitrary > 0. Now let us look at what perturbation w we need such that A(x + w) is not in B 1 . One can show that A(x + w) is outside B 1 if and only if, P (x − c 1 + w) > r. Then by the triangular inequality, the attacker can take an attack w with w > r − P (x − c 1 ) , which is no bigger than r − √ 1 − M N x − c 1 2 with high probability, for arbitrary > 0 and big enough M .
2) If and only if h(x + w) = h(t), ∀t ∈ S i , w will not fool the classifier into label i. If h(y) = Ay, "h(x + w) = h(t), ∀t ∈ S i " is equivalent to " A(x + w − t) = 0, ∀t ∈ S i ", which is in turn equivalent to " P (x + w − t) = 0, ∀t ∈ S i ", where P is the projection onto the row space of A. Assuming that w is uniformly randomly sampled from a sphere in R N of radius l < 1−
From the concentration inequality,
Thus if M is big enough, with high probability,
If w = l, P (x + w − t) > 0. Now let us look at what magnitude we need for a random perturbation w such that A(x + w) is in B 1 with high probability. We know A(x + w) is in B 1 if and only if, P (x − c 1 + w) < r. Through a large deviation analysis, one can show that, for any δ > 0 and big enough M ,
2 , P (x − c 1 + w) < r with high probability, implying the AI classifier still classifies the y = x + w into Class 1 correctly.
3) Suppose that an AI classifier classifies the input signal y = x + w into label i. We propose to check whether y belongs to S i . In our model, the signal y belongs to S i only if min ci∈Xi y − c i ≤ r. Let us take any codeword c i ∈ X i . We show that when w < c i − x − r, we can always detect the adversarial attack if the AI classifier misclassifies y to that codeword corresponding to label i. In fact, y − c i = (x + w) − c i 2 , which is no smaller
We note that w ≤ min ci∈Xi c i − x − r means w 2 < c i − x − r for every codeword c i , thus implying that the adversary attack detection technique can detect that y is at more than distance r from every codeword from X i .
Nonlinear Decision Statistics in AI Classifiers
In this subsection, we show that an AI classifier using nonlinear compressed decision statistics h(y) ∈ R M is significantly more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than to random perturbations. We will quantify the gap between how much a random perturbation and a well-designed adversarial attack affect h(y).
Theorem 2. Let us assume that the nonlinear function
and
where o is uniformly randomly sampled from a unit sphere. Then
where E o means expectation over the distribution of o. If we assume that the entries of the Jacobian matrix ∇h(x) ∈ R M ×N are i.i.d. distributed following the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), then, when N is big enough, with high probability,
Before we proceed, we introduce some technical lemmas which are used to establish the gap quantification in Theorem 2.
Lemma 3. (Section III in [7] ) For a random matrix F ∈ R M ×N , M > N with every entry being i.i.d. random variable distributed accord to Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/M ), we can have
where σ max (F ) is the maximal singular value of F , the σ min (F ) is the smallest singular value of F , and the o(1) is a small term tending to zero as M → ∞.
From Lemma 3, we see that for a random matrix F ∈ R M ×N (M < N ) with all entries i.i.d. distributed according to standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), the scaled matrix
where σ i (F ) is the i-th largest singular value of F .
Proof. (of Theorem 2) From the Taylor expansion, we know
where
where σ max (∇h(x)) is the maximal singular value of ∇h(x). Here the random vector o is obtained by first sampling each entry i.i.d. from the standard Gaussian distribution, and then normalizing the magnitude, i.e.,
where all entries of g ∈ R N are i.i.d. distributed according to the standard Gaussian distribution. We first consider the deterministic ∇h(x). Let the SVD of ∇h(x) be ∇h(
Then from the convexity of x 2 and Jensen's inequality, we have
T is a Gaussian random vector after rotating the Gaussian random vector g by V * .
Actually, each element of
* acts on a standard Gaussian random vector g, we will get
This gives
Thus, combining (12), we get
We now consider the case where the entries of ∇h(x) ∈ R M ×N are i.i.d. distributed according to standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). From Lemma 3, we have with high probability that for δ > 0
Since the Gaussian random vector is rotationally invariant, without loss of generality, we take the o as
Then the ∇h(x) is a vector with all entries being i.i.d. distributed according to standard Gaussian distribution. From the convexity of x 2 and Jensen's inequality, we have
then the function f (x) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1. Then for ∇h(x)o , we have for every t ≥ 0,
This means the ∇h(x)o is concentrated at E ∇h(x) { ∇h(x)o } which is less than √ M . Thus, combining (12) and (14), we have with high probability
Experimental Results
We now present two sets of experimental results to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed defense against adversarial attacks.
Speech Recognition
Our first set of experiments were based on a popular voice recognition AI classifier DeepSpeech 2 . The experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 4 ; a visual comparison with the abstract model in Fig.2 shows how the various functional blocks are implemented.
The experiment 3 consisted of choosing sentences randomly from the classic 19-th century novel "A Tale of Two Cities." A Linux text-to-speech (T2S) software, Pico2wave, converted a chosen sentence e.g. u 1 into a female 
Original Text
Original Text Recognized Adversarial Text Recognized it was the best of times it was the best of times he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the worst of times it was the worst of times he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the age of wisdom it was the age of witdom he travels the fastest who ravels alone it was the age of foolishness it was the age of foolishness he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the epoch of belief it was the eot of belief he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the epoch of incredulity it was the epoth of imfidulity he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the season of Light it was the season of light he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the season of Darkness it was the season of darkness he travels the fastest who travels alone it was the spring of hope it was the spring of hope he travels the fatest who travels alone it was the winter of despair it was the winter of this care he traves the fastest who travels alone voice wave file. The use of a T2S system for generating the source audio signal (instead of human-spoken audio) effectively allows us to hold the all "irrelevant" variables v constant, and thus renders the signal synthesis block in Fig. 2 as a deterministic function of just the input label u 1 . Let x denote the samples of this source audio signal. This audio signal is played over a PC speaker and recorded by a USB microphone on another PC. Let y 1 denote the samples of this recorded wave file. The audio playback and recording was performed in a quiet room with no audible echoes or distortions, so this "channel" can be approximately modeled as a simple AWGN channel: y 1 = αx + w 1 , where α is a scalar representing audio signal attenuation and w 1 is random background noise. In our experiment, the SNR . =
2 was approximately 28 dB. We input y 1 into a voice recognition system, specifically, the Mozilla implementation DeepSpeech V0.1.1 based on TensorFlow. The 10 detailed sentences are demonstrated in Table 1 . We then used Nicholas Carlini's adversarial attack Python script 4 with Deep Speech (V0.1.1) through gradient back-propagation to generate a targeted adversarial audio signal y 2 = y 1 + w 2 where w 2 is a small adversarial perturbation that causes the DeepSpeech voice recognition system to predict a completely different sentence u 2 . Thus, we have a "clean" audio signal y 1 , and a "targeted corrupted" adversarial audio signal y 2 that upon playback is effectively indistinguishable from y 1 , but successfully fools DeepSpeech into outputting a different target sentence. In our experiment, the power of y 2 over the adversarial perturbation w 2 was approximately 35 dB.
We then implemented a version of our proposed defense to detect whether the output of the DeepSpeech is wrong, whether due to noises or adversarial attacks. For this purpose, we fed the decoded text output of the DeepSpeech system into the same T2S software Pico2Wave, to generate a reconstructed female voice wave file, denoted byx. We then performed a simple cross-correlation of a portion of the reconstructed signal (representing approximately 10% reconstruction of the original number of samples in x) with the input signal y to the DeepSpeech classifier:
where x[n] denotes the n-th entry of x. If ρ max is smaller than a threshold (0.4), we declare that the speech recognition classification is wrong. The logic behind this test is as follows. When the input signal is y 1 i.e. the non-adversarial-perturbed signal, the DeepSpeech successfully outputs the correct labelû ≡ u 1 ,which results in x ≡ x. Since y 1 is just a noisy version of x, it will be highly correlated withx. On the other hand, for the adversarial-perturbed input y 2 , the reconstructed signalx is completely different from x and therefore can be expected to be practically uncorrelated with y 2 . Fig.5 shows the cross-correlation ρ max (x, y) for 10 sets of recorded signals (a) with and (b) without adversarial perturbations (red triangles and blue circles respectively in Fig. 5 ). More details about the quantitative results can be found in Table 2 . The adversarial perturbations all successfully fool the DeepSpeech AI to output the target text u 2 ="he travels the fastest who travels alone". We see that the observed correlations for the adversarial signals are always very small, and are therefore successfully detected by our correlation test. Interestingly, some of the non-adversarial signals yield low correlations as well, but this is because the DeepSpeech cannot decode perfectly even when there are no adversarial attacks present.
Image Classification
Our second set of experimental results are for image classification on MNIST data set [29] . For MNIST data set [29] which is a collection of hand-written digits, there are 60, 000 samples in its training data set, and 10,000 samples in its testing data set. Each of the digit image sample is a gray-scale image of size 28 × 28 × 1 and has totally 784 pixels.
We borrow a trained neural network and adversarial example generation implementation from Siddhartha Rao Kamalakara 5 . A convolutional neural network (CNN) is used for MNIST digit classification. This CNN classifier is trained to achieve a testing classification accuracy of 99.10%. Adversarial samples for this classifier were generated using the FGSM method [22] . Let us denote by x i the benign samples in class i, and denote by x i→j an adversarial sample which is in class i but misclassified as in class j = i. In the experiments, we generate 9 adversarial images for each testing sample, for each targeted class. For example, there are about 1,000 images in the testing data set which correspond to digital 1, and we generate, for each of them, 9 corresponding adversarial images, x 1→0 , x 1→2 , · · · , x 1→9 . Adversarial samples generated by fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [22] for fooling the CNN classifier into making wrong decisions are shown in Figure 6 .
In the following, we present experimental results on proposed method for detecting adversarial samples, i.e., the pixel prediction method, and the generative model based optimization approach. Both these approaches originate from the same idea presented at the end of Section 2, i.e., solving c j (y, p(y), ta(y)) = arg min and then evaluating d j (y, p(y), ta(y)) = ta(y) − ta(c j (y, p(y), ta(y))) .
The pixel prediction method uses unmasked pixels of an image to predict the behavior of the masked pixels, and then evaluate ta(y) − ta(c j (y, p(y), ta(y))) over these predicted pixels. Thus the function ta(y) for the prediction network is the projection mapping to the masked pixels, and p(y) is the projection mapping to the unmasked pixels.
In the optimization based generative model method, we use latent variables to generate full images (codewords c j ) for label j, and then minimize y − c j (y) , where ta(y) is the identity mapping, namely ta(y) = y. Evaluation Metric of Detection Performance Let us denote by N ben and N adv respectively the total number of benign samples, and the total number of adversarial samples. We denote by N c ben the number of benign samples which are correctly detected as benign samples. Similarly, we denote by N c adv the number of adversarial samples which are correctly detected as adversarial samples. We define the false alarm rate and missing rate as 
Defense using the Pixel Prediction Network
We design a pixel prediction neural network which uses part of pixels in an image to predict the rest pixels of it, and we refer to it as the pixel predictor. For example, given an image x ∈ R N with N = 784 pixels, we can sample a subset S in ⊂ [N ] of all its pixels such that |S in | := N in = 0.9 * N ≈ 705 pixels and use it as input sample for the pixel predictor. The rest N out = N − N in = 79 pixels are used as output sample of the pixel predictor, and are specified by S out = [N ] \ S in where |S out | = N out . The set of such new input-output pairs is used to train and test the pixel predictor.
For a given sampling percentage pctg ∈ (0, 1), we consider different sampling patterns, i.e., central square sampling (CSS), central row sampling (CRS). For an image sample x of width W and height H, the CSS procedure will first compute L = (1 − pctg) * N , and then take the central square with side length L of the image x as the output of pixel predictors, which means N out = L 2 . The CRS procedure will first compute L = (1 − pctg) * N , and then take the central L rows of the sample x as the output of the pixel predictors, which means N out = W L.
After we get the predictions for masked pixel values, we can compute the mean squared error (MSE) for predicted values and the ground truth values, i.e.,
wherex Sout is predicted by the pixel predictor. Instead of training a universal pixel predictor, we train class-dependent pixel predictors for different classes. Let us denote by M SE i→j the MSE computed from adversarial samples in class i but missclassified as in class j, j = i, and denote by M SE i the MSE computed from benign samples in class i. For example, we can take all the samples with digit 3 from the MNIST training data (totally 5,638 out of 60,000) and testing data (totally 1,010 out of 10,000). Once the pixel predictors are well-trained, we can use them for detecting adversarial attacks. More specifically, suppose we have an adversarial sample which is digit 3 but misclassified by the CNN classifier as digit 8. Then we will test the pixel predictor (trained on benign samples from class 8) on this adversarial sample, and compute the corresponding MSE. If MSE for this adversarial image M SE 3→8 is much larger than the MSE of the pixel predictor over the MNIST testing data M SE 8 , i.e.,
where c is a preset constant, then we claim the given image is an attacking attempt. 
Structure of Pixel Prediction Neural Network
For MNIST data set, the pixel predictors are fully connected neural networks (FNN). The FNN has totally three layers, with 300, 300, N out neurons in the first, second, and third layer, respectively. The activation functions used in each layer are sigmoid functions. We denote the FNN pixel predictors trained on digit 0, 1, · · · , and 9 by F N N 0 , F N N 1 , · · · , and F N N 9 , respectively. All the F N N i are trained with learning rate 0.002 and batch size 128, and the training process terminates after 20 epochs. In Figure Table 3 : Evaluation of reconstruction of MSE using the pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 0. All the adversarial samples from other classes are misclassified as class 0. Each x i means benign or good samples from class i, and each x j→i means adversarial samples from class j = i but misclassified in class i. Table 4 : Evaluation of reconstruction MSE using pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 0. All the adversarial samples from other classes are misclassified as class 0. Each x i means benign or good samples from class i, and each x j→i means adversarial samples from class j = i but misclassified as class i.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% Effects of Sampling Percentage For CSS pattern, we now consider a given target class, and generate adversarial samples from all the rest 9 classes which are misclassified by the classifier as this target class. We train a FNN pixel predictor using benign samples from the target class, and then evaluate the trained FNN pixel predictor over the adversarial samples from the other 9 classes. Note that there are about 1,000 benign samples in the testing data set for each class. When we evaluate the performance of F N N 0 , we will compute the MSE it gives for the 1,000 benign samples x 0 , the 1,000 adversarial samples x 1→0 ,..., the 1,000 adversarial samples x 9→0 . The readers are invited to see Table 3 and Figure 8a for performance of FNN pixel predictor trained on benign samples in class 0, and evaluated over adversarial samples from other classes which are misclassified as class 0. See Table 11 Figure 8b,16a,16b,17a,17b,18a,18b,19a,19b in Appendix for other cases. Similarly for CRS pattern, we consider a given target class, and generate adversarial samples from all the rest 9 classes which are misclassified by the classifier as this target class. We train a FNN pixel predictor using benign samples from the target class, and then evaluate the trained FNN pixel predictor over the adversarial samples from the other 9 classes. See Table 4 and Figure and we notice that pctg = 0.95 achieves relatively better results than other choices, i.e., the gap between MSE for benign samples and that for adversarial samples is bigger. Now we use a fixed sampling percentage pctg = 0.95, and all the other parameters are the same as in previous experiments. For each trained pixel prediction network F N N i , we will use it to compute the MSE for each benign sample in class i in the testing data set (about 1,000 images), and we then plot the histogram for them. Similarly, for all the adversarial samples from all other classes (about 1,000 images for each class, and totally about 9,000 images), we do the same. We first present results for the central square sampling pattern. The MSE distributions for F N N 0 on benign samples and adversarial samples are shown in Figure 10a . When central row sampling pattern is used, the MSE distributions for F N N 0 on benign samples and adversarial samples are shown in Figure 11a . Note that the vertical axis represents the probability density . More results can be found in Figure 10b, 24a,24b,25a,25b,26a,26b,27a,27b,  11b, 28a,28b,29a,29b,30a,30b,31a,31b . From the tables and results for other cases in the appendix, we can have some interesting statistical observations. First of all, when F N N i is given, then no matter what sampling percentage is used, the x i can achieve the lowest MSE when compared with x j→i , j = i for most of the time. Though for some F N N i (i.e., i = 2, 8), the pixel prediction network can assign larger MSE for x i than the one assigned to x j→i , j = i for some choices of sampling percentages, the F N N i can always assign a larger MSE to x j→i , j = i when the sampling percentage is big enough (i.e., 0.95). With a big enough sampling percentage, the MSE of x j→i , j = i can be several times as big as that of x i . Thus, it can be statistically easy to separate adversarial samples and benign samples due to the big gap between their MSEs. For example, for F N N 0 with a sampling percentage of 95%, we can choose a threshold of 0.10, all the adversarial samples from other classes achieve higher MSE than 0.10, while the benign samples achieve (18) . Thus, for each prediction network, we can have a sequence of such missing rate and false alarm rate pairs. We plot relation between missing rate and false alarm, and the result is shown in Figure 12a . Similarly for central row sampling case, we take the thresholds from 0.05 to 0.50. The result is shown in Figure  12b . From the results in Figure 12a and 12b, no matter which prediction network and which sampling pattern are considered, we can see that when we increase the threshold from 0.05 to 0.5 or 0.7, the false alarm decreases and the missing rate increases. We assume that the two types of mistakes have the same risk, and use a threshold achieving a balance between missing rate and false alarm rate. For a given prediction neural network and a given threshold, we also give quantitative detection performance metrics for some digit cases for illustration of the Figure 12a and 12b in Table 5 and 6. From the results, we can see that the pixel prediction detection (PPD) method, though simple, can achieve reasonably good detection performance. For some cases, it can achieve even more than 95.00% detection accuracy for both benign samples and adversarial samples (i.e., F N N 1 ). However, for some cases, it can only achieve about 80.00% detection accuracy.
Adversarial Detection Using Generative Models
In this section, we present a general method for detecting adversarial attacks which follows directly from our theoretical results. Specifically, according to our feature compression hypothesis, adversarial fragility is a direct consequence of a compression process that maps high dimensional inputs to a set of low-dimensional latent variables; our proposed defense uses a reverse process i.e. a feature decompression to regenerate a rich set of "denoised features" conditioned on the classifier output. These regenerated features are then compared against the raw input signal for statistical consistency. Different from the pixel prediction approach where we use partial input pixels to estimate the rest, the detection approach based on generative model will use latent codes to estimate the whole image. We call models as generators G : R N low → R N high which can map latent codes in R N low to inputs in R N high . By training generators for each data class using the benign samples from this class, the output of generators can approximate input samples in R N high . Once the generators are well-trained, for a given input image x in R N high which is classified by a classifier as i, we then find a latent code z ∈ R N low such that G i (z) is the best approximation of x where G i : R N low → R N high is a generator trained using benign samples from class i. This is achieved by solving
Once z is found, we can get the approximation error x − G i (z) 2 2 which can be used as a criterion for deciding whether the given input is an adversarial sample or not.
For MNIST data set, we will use generators from deep convolutional generative adversarial networks (DCGANs). Firstly, we scale all the image samples from 28 × 28 to 64 × 64. Secondly, we train 10 DCGANs for the 10 digit classes, i.e., DCGAN i is trained using all the samples from digit class i. Once the DCGAN is well-trained, the generator of it will map low dimensional vectors z ∈ R 100 to digit images in high dimensional space R 64×64 . Thirdly, for an image x, we will try to find a vector z ∈ R 100 such that the output of the DCGAN i will be the optimal class-i approximation of x. This can be modeled as the following optimization min z∈R 100
where x i ∈ R 64×64 is a digital image sample from class i. Fourthly, once we find the solution z using gradient descent algorithm, we will calculate the mean squared error (MSE)
We say a sample is a benign sample if it can be correctly classified by a classifier, and denote it by x i . We say a sample is an adversarial sample if it is from class j, but is misclassified as in class i, and we denote it by x j→i where j = i. In the following, we will investigate for a given well-trained generator DCGAN i , how the MSE will behave when we solve (23) with different types of digit images.
The experimental set up is: (1) We add a regularization term to restrict the searching space for z, i.e., min z∈R 100
(2) We normalize each x i ∈ R 784 over its entries, i.e., we obtain
, where
where [x i ] j is the j-th element of sample x i . The normalization step will make all the pixels concentrated at 0 with a standard deviation 1, i.e., concentrated within [−1, 1]. This will coincide greatly with the range of the pixels generated by the generator which uses a tanh activation function. (3) We record the z which achieves the smallest MSE in numerically solving the regularized optimization problem. Remarks: (1) the process of resizing image sample from R 28×28 to R 64×64 is not necessary, and the 28 × 28 can be directly used. We use this extra step just to make the image size the same as that accepted by the DCGAN we have trained. The readers can train their own DCGANs using different image sizes. (2) The motivation for adding regularization term is to regularize the capability of the generators for approximating images. Without regularization, the generators can be powerful enough to approximate images out of its class, i.e., the generator of DCGAN 9 can give a good approximation for adversarial samples from class 0 but misclassified as 9, by finding some z in R 100 , thus achieving low MSE for adversarial samples. Regularization can force the generator to generate only images from its corresponding class. (3) The normalization process is not necessary either. We introduce this step because we use DCGAN producing pixel values within [−1, 1]. Single Sample Detection In the experiments, we take DCGAN 9 , and the λ = 100. The learning rate is 0.05, and the Adam optimizer is used for searching the optimal z using gradient descent. The search algorithm will terminate after 2500 iterations. Every time, only single image is fed to the trained generator. The MSEs for adversarial from different classes but misclassified as class 9 are presented in Table 7 . From the results, we can see that the MSE for adversarial sample can be tens times as big as that for benign sample, which can guarantee very accurate and robust detection performance. The visualized results are shown in Figure 13a , 13b. For other DCGANs, the MSEs are recorded in Table 29 , 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 in Appendix. Table 7 : Enlarged MSE gap for DCGAN 9 . Single image sample is used. Effect of Regularization Parameter All the setup is the same as previous sections unless specified explicitly. We fix the learning rate to be 0.05, and take regularization parameter λ to be 0, 1, 10, 100, 1,000, and 10,000 respectively. We use DCGAN 9 and adversarial sample from class 0 to do the experiments. The results are recorded in Table 8 . From the results, we can see that when there is no regularization term, the generator can find good approximation for adversarial samples. But the MSE for adversarial sample is much larger than that for benign samples, i.e., a gap of approximately 50 times the MSE of benign samples. As we increase λ, the MSEs for both benign sample and adversarial sample will increase first and then remain around a particular value. In the following, we will use a fixed regularization parameter λ = 100. MSE Distribution and Detection Accuracy In this section, we will evaluate the detection accuracy of the proposed method statistically. We use DCGAN 0 as an example to illustrate the idea. The DCGAN 0 will produce an MSE for each given image, we compare it with a threshold τ . If the MSE is much greater than τ , then it will be reported as an adversarial sample. Otherwise, it is reported as a benign sample. For all the benign samples from class 0, we compute the detection accuracy of benign samples ρ c ben defined in (19) . For adversarial samples from class j = 0, we compute the detection accuracy of adversarial samples ρ c adv defined in (19) . The missing rate and the false alarm rate can be computed according to (18) .
For each generator DCGAN i , we randomly take 90 benign samples from class i, and another 90 adversarial samples from classes j = i. For example, we can randomly take 90 benign samples from class 1. We randomly take adversarial samples from class 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 which are misclassified as class 1, and the total number is 90. We present the quantitative results in Table 9 and 10. Similar to pixel prediction detection method, we choose different thresholds, and the plot the relation between missing rate and false alarm in Figure 14 . The distributions of MSEs for each generator are shown in Figure 15a,15b,32a,32b,33a,33b,34a,34b, 35a ,35b. From the Table 9 , 10, Figure 15a and results in the appendix, we can see that the detection method based on generative model can achieve high performance, i.e., achieving more than 95.00% detection accuracy for all cases and well separated MSEs for samples from different classes. 
Conclusions
Based on the feature compression property, we explained the fragility of AI classifiers from the point view of information theory. The theoretical results apply to all classifiers which learn low dimensional representations before making classification decisions. We proposed two methods for detecting adversarial samples based on the idea of "decompression", i.e., pixel prediction detection (PPD) method and optimization-based generative detection (OGD) approach. The former method can achieve as high as 95.00% detection accuracy for both benign samples and adversarial samples for some digit classes, but as low as about 80.00% for some other cases. The latter method can perform well both statistically and for individual sample, and can achieve more than 95.00% detection accuracy for all the experiments we conducted. For some cases, it can even achieve 100.00% detection accuracy for both the benign samples and adversarial samples. These experimental results supports our theoretical claims and show the effectiveness of the proposed idea for adversarial detection.
A Effects of Sampling Percentage
A.1 Central Square Sampling Pattern Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 0.14 0.13 0.14 0. 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.11
0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.21 Table 19 : Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 9.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13
A.2 Central Rows Sampling Pattern
0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0. 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.09
0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.07
0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 x 6→4 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11
0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15
0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11
0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 x 5 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05
0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 x 7→5 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.14 x 8→5 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11
0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07
0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 x 3→6 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11
0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.12 x 5→6 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05
0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10
0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11
0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 x 4→8 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 x 6→8 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17
0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 x 8 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06
0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14 Table 28 : Evaluation of pixel prediction FNN over adversarial samples from different classes. We show the inference MSE for each situation. The network is trained with good samples from class 9.
Sampling percentage 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% C Single Sample Detection using Generative Model 
